Please note: This is a companion version & not the original book.Sample Book Insights:#1 I had returned from Iraq in 2004, after spending a summer there as the CIA’s point person for their Iraq terrorism analysis group in Baghdad. I had volunteered for a temporary duty assignment to Iraq to find signs that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was still in Iraq.#2 The OSP seemed to utterly disregard the analytic tradecraft that the CIA holds dear. They passed along raw intelligence without context and without explaining the reliability of the source to the White House.#3 In late 2002, the Bush administration pinpointed a new bogeyman to bolster its hegemonic intent: a thirty-six-year-old former drug-dealing street thug from Jordan named Ahmad Fadil al-Nazal al-Khalayleh. He would eventually join al Qaida after the invasion.#4 The president’s assertion that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and was connected to al Qaida was a gross exaggeration. The CIA had determined that Zarqawi’s organization didn’t know about the 9/11 attacks, much less participate in them.